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Abstract
The paper investigates empirically the impact that outsourcing strate-
gies have on the labour productivity of ﬁrms embedded in a local produc-
tion system characterized by idiosyncratic techno-economic and organi-
zational features. A diachronic cross-section econometric model of the
productivity impact of outsourcing is applied to a sample of ﬁrms based
in the local production system (LPS) of Reggio Emilia (RE) (in Emilia
Romagna, Italy). The application conﬁrms some of the results the em-
pirical literature reports for other no or less context speciﬁc empirical
applications, in particular their dependency on the kind of outsourced ac-
tivities, the internationalization of the outsourcing ﬁrm and time horizon
of the productivity eﬀects. On the other hand, when the actual extent at
∗Although the four authors contributed equally to the paper, Section 6 could be attributed
to Davide Antonioli, Section 4 to Massimiliano Mazzanti, Section 2 and 3 to Sandro Montresor,
Section 5 to Paolo Pini. We thank the participants to the Final Workshop of the PRIN2005
on “Fragmentation and Local Development”, Padua (Italy), June 3-4, 2008, and to the 2008
ENEF Metting on “Knowledge, Organization and the Firm, LEM, Scuola Superiore S.Anna,
Pisa (Italy) September 11-12, 2008, for their suggestions on an earlier version of the paper.
The usual disclaimers apply.
†Department of Economics, University of Bologna (Italy). E-mail: san-
dro.montreso@.unibo.it
‡Department of Economics, Institutions and Territory (DEIT), University of Ferrara
(Italy). E-mail: ntndvd@unife.it
§DEIT, University of Ferrara (Italy). E-mail: mazzanti@economia.unife.it
¶DEIT, University of Ferrara (Italy). E-mail: pnipna@unife.it
1which the diﬀerent kinds of activities are outsourced is retained, impor-
tant exceptions to these results are obtained: the positive impact of the
externalization of manufacturing activities is the most relevant and the
most consistent with the district nature of the investigated LPS.
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tions, innovation
JEL codes: L22, D23, J53
21 Introduction
Empirical evidence shows that both the volume and the value of intermedi-
ate inputs and business production services contracted out by ﬁrms, that is of
outsourcing, have risen dramatically in the last two decays (Kirkegaard, 2005;
Spencer, 2005). This has recently spurred a substantial interest in the issue,
from several and diﬀerent perspectives, spanning from the economics of the
ﬁrm, through industrial organization, to international trade. In particular, the
attention has focused on the analysis of outsourcing determinants, leading to the
formulation and empirical tests of a number of theories of the vertical scope of
the ﬁrms. Standard transaction-cost-economics (TCE) based explanations (e.g.
Grossman and Helpman, 2002) have thus been both contrasted (e.g. Mahnke,
2001) and integrated (e.g. Jacobides and Winter, 2005) with capabilities and
competences based ones, and, more recently, with an entrepreneurship kind of
perspective (e.g. Zander, 2007). What is more, these explanations have found
as many speciﬁcations and integrations as when applied to the very special case
of international outsourcing, or oﬀshoring, with respect to which “international
fragmentation of production” (e.g. Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001), international
trade in intermediate commodities and in services, and MNC networks (e.g.
Kleinert, 2003) become relevant.
Quite surprisingly, this massive interest for the outsourcing determinants of
the ﬁrms has not been accompanied by an as widespread attention for its eﬀects
on their performances. Indeed, most research on the outsourcing eﬀects has
mainly focused on concerns related to labour markets, trying to investigate the
potential negative impact of it on such “hot issues” as employment losses, wage
and skill biases: the recent OECD Report on “Oﬀshoring and Employment:
Trends and Impacts” (OECD, 2007) is just one of the proofs of this attention.
While extremely important, not to say increasingly politically charged, these
aspects have somehow obscured the analysis of the impact that outsourcing has
on the ﬁrms’ productivity and proﬁtability. As one of the most extensive surveys
of the literature states among the premises:
“Yet, little rigorous [empirical] research on oﬀshoring and its impacts
on productivity or ﬁrm performance has been conducted.” (Olsen,
2006, p.5).
It is the purpose of this paper to contribute ﬁlling this gap by providing
some evidence on the impact that outsourcing has on the labour productivity
of ﬁrms embedded in a local production system characterized by idiosyncratic
techno-economic and organizational features. In so doing, the main value added
3of the paper is that of testing whether such an embeddedness might make the
productivity impact of outsourcing dependent on a number of factors, which
are not usually considered in the analysis of big-companies’ externalization,
and which could possibly end up with mitigating, if not even reversing, the
theoretical and empirical results obtained with respect to them.
More precisely, such a test is performed by applying a diachronic cross-
section econometric model of the productivity impact of outsourcing to a sample
of ﬁrms based in the local production system (LPS) of Reggio Emilia (in Emilia
Romagna, Italy), for which survey-based outsourcing and balance-sheet data
have been collected for, respectively, 1998-2001 and 2002-2005.
The paper consists of ﬁve more sections. Section 2 outlines the issue and
brieﬂy presents the “contrasting” links between outsourcing and ﬁrm perfor-
mance (productivity, in particular), which emerge by integrating the dominant
“positive” view with a more recent, “negative”, one. Section 3 reports the scanty
conﬁrmations that these theoretical arguments have found in their not numerous
empirical applications at the ﬁrm level, and point to some critical methodolog-
ical drawbacks which could have aﬀected the results. Section 4 presents an
econometric model which is able to address some of these problems. Section 5
describes the context of the province of Reggio Emilia, to which such a model
will be applied, along with the datasets used in the application. Section 6 com-
ments its main results. Some conclusive remarks and research agenda for the
future (Section 7) close the paper.
2 The theoretical link between outsourcing and
ﬁrm performance
2.1 The issue at stake
Running the risk of becoming another “buzzy-word”, outsourcing is nowadays
used by diﬀerent scholars and professionals to denote diﬀerent phenomena, and
often used interchangeably with other similar words as oﬀshoring, insourcing,
and the like. Accordingly, clarifying the meaning we attach to it in the paper
is necessary at the outset.
By referring to the OECD conceptual framework (OECD, 2007, p.15), with
outsourcing we here generally mean “the use of goods and services produced out-
side the enterprise”: no matter if this is also outside the national boundaries of
the ﬁrm or not, providing it is outside the ﬁrm’s boundaries (Table 1). In other
words, our outsourcing encompasses both domestic and international outsourc-
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Table 1: The OECD outsourcing framework (OECD, 2007)
ing. Of course, we are aware of the fact that the two phenomena overlap only
partially in terms of determinants and implications. However, also for the sake
of consistency with the empirical application we will carry out – whose dataset
reports the two indistinguishably – in the following we will refer to their “least
common multiple” and diﬀerentiate their analysis whenever necessary only.
The theoretical literature on outsourcing at the ﬁrm level is really massive,
and mainly concentrates on the outsourcing determinants.1 Quite surprisingly,
the relative contributions rarely encompass among these determinants, at least
directly, a prospective increase in the performance of the outsourcing ﬁrms,
either in terms of productivity or proﬁtability. Indeed, ﬁrms are usually rec-
ommended to shift from “make” to “buy” in order to save on their internal
administration costs (e.g. Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Helpman, 2002),
providing the relative ownership re-allocation does not threaten asset speciﬁc
investments (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986), or the ensued agency relationship
does not pose asymmetric-information problems (e.g. Aghion and Tirole, 1997).
Recently, outsourcing has also been envisaged as a tool for ﬁrms to specialize on
their core competences, escape “learning-traps” by tapping into the providers
(Mahnke, 2001; Jacobides and Winter, 2005), if not discover and implement
new entrepreneurial opportunities (e.g. Hsieh, NIcherson, and Zenger, 2007),
especially in terms of innovation (Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini, 2007a).
In all these contributions, a positive impact on the outsourcing ﬁrm’s perfor-
mance is envisaged only indirectly, if not just implicitly, although to a variable
extent depending on the speciﬁc approach: in the resource-competence-based
1For a schematic survey of the literature related to the outsourcing ﬁrm as an organization,
production, industrial and innovation unit of analysis see, for example, Mazzanti, Montresor,
and Pini (2007b).
5view, for example, of a more managerial nature, specialization and competitive
advantages emerge more clearly. However, if one wants to ﬁnd a more explicit
theoretical account of the ﬁrm performance impact of outsourcing, she has to
integrate the literature at the ﬁrm level with that at a more aggregate level,
mainly sectoral and intersectoral, and, what is more, support purely theoretical
predictions with empirical ex-post rationalizations (Olsen, 2006).
2.2 Gains and losses from outsourcing
In so doing, it seems to us that the “dominant” view is a positive one, according
to which ﬁrms should gain from outsourcing, both in terms of productivity
(labour and total) and proﬁtability, both in the short and in the long-run.
Starting with productivity gains, in the short-run they should accrue to
mainly in the form of labour productivity increases: either because external
inputs become available at lower costs – exploiting cost diﬀerentials in inter-
national labour markets (e.g. Kohler, 2004) or economies of scale of national
external suppliers (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2005) – or because specialist
suppliers provide inputs of higher quality (e.g. Heshmati, 2003). In the long-run,
further increases in labour productivity could be associated to changes in factor
shares, namely to the externalization of less skill-intensive tasks and to the re-
allocation of labour toward more skill-intensive ones (e.g Feenstra and Hanson,
1999). Over time outsourcing could be also expected to positively aﬀect total
factor productivity, along with its growth and that of labour productivity itself.
Indeed, by outsourcing ﬁrms could focus on their core competencies and thus
increase their innovativeness (Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini, 2007a), or/and
integrate more eﬃcient external business services into their manufacturing op-
erations (ten Raa and Wolﬀ, 2001). Although less explored, positive appears
to be in general also the expected impact that outsourcing should theoretically
have on ﬁrms’ proﬁtability, given the organizational competitiveness they gain
by focusing on those internal resources and competences which are relatively
scarce and durable (Sharpe, 1997).2
While the main theoretical, or “quasi-theoretical”, view is positive, a num-
ber of negative views on the performance impact of outsourcing are emerging,
especially in the form of ex-post rationalizations of empirical studies. This
is particularly so when productivity is considered in the short-run, as labour-
market rigidities could initially hamper the re-skilling of the workforce in the
2Given the focus of the paper on productivity-based performance measures, the proﬁtability
impact of outsourcing will be postponed to our future research agenda.
6aftermath of outsourcing. Furthermore, cultural and linguistic barriers to an
eﬃcient exploitation of foreign providers could add in the case of international
outsourcing (e.g Egger and Egger, 2006).
Productivity and productivity growth, both labour and total, might be neg-
atively aﬀected by outsourcing in the long-run too: for example, because by
decoupling production (outsourced) from R&D (in-house) activities, outsourc-
ing lessens the feed-backs from the former to the latter, especially in the case of
international distances, and thus the outsourcing ﬁrm’s innovation capabilities
(Naghavi and Ottaviano, 2006). Similar outsourcing losses have been theo-
rized, this time more extensively than the positive counter-part, also in terms
of proﬁtability: both in the short-run, due to the managers under-estimation
of its transaction costs (Young and Macneil, 2000; Benson, 1999), and in the
long-run, given the emergence of imitative behaviors of successfully outsourcing
ﬁrms (Gorzig and Stephan, 2002).
Although, as we said, relatively less established, these negative positions
deserve particular attention once compared with the positive view. In particular,
it turns interesting to establish whether the two views hold alternatively, or
rather simultaneously with respect to diﬀerent time horizons, a task for which
the empirical evidence becomes extremely important.
3 The empirical link between outsourcing and
productivity at the ﬁrm level
3.1 The general evidence
In the impact analysis of outsourcing at the ﬁrm level, productivity has at-
tracted much more attention than proﬁtability (Olsen, 2006). Although a num-
ber of studies have been recently published which retain gross-operating-surplus
(GOS) as dependent variable (e.g. Gorzig and Stephan, 2002), productivity-
based measures seem to oﬀer more accurate and reliable interpretations than
balance-sheet performance data. This justiﬁes the choice of the present study,
to start investigating the impact that outsourcing in LPS ﬁrms has on labour
productivity, and to postpone the analysis of its impact on TFP and on prof-
itability to our future research agenda (Section 7).
The number of empirical tests of the productivity impact of outsourcing has
increased dramatically in the last few years. Out of the 24 papers ECONLIT
reports to have hosted “outsourcing AND productivity” in their titles since
the celebrated 1992 article by Siegel and Griliches (1992), as many as 12 have
7been published in the last three years, that is since 2006. On the other hand,
this explosion of studies have occurred piecemeal at diﬀerent levels of analysis,
lacking of comparability and restricting genuinely congruent general results.
What is more, the attention of the policy makers for the outsourcing implica-
tions for domestic labour markets, the readiness of the famous Feenstra-Hanson
sectoral measures of outsourcing, and the increasing availability of input-output
data with which to increase their accuracy (e.g. Falzoni and Tajoli, 2008; Daveri,
Iommi, and Jona-Lasinio, 2006) have determined a quantitative supremacy of
studies using aggregate data (e.g. Lo Turco, 2007). Which is particularly unfor-
tunate, as it has been shown that, even within narrowly deﬁned industries, the
investigated relationship is aﬀected by large and persistent heterogeneity across
ﬁrms, so that evidences at the micro level are needed (Bartelsman and Doms,
2000).
Even by focusing on the relative few evidences at the ﬁrm and/or plant level,
the picture remains quite blurred. What emerges from the most comprehensive
review of this kind of micro-literature is actually the lack of clear patterns as
to outsourcing aﬀects productivity (Olsen, 2006, p.28). However, some general
results can be stated to hold even beyond the numerous speciﬁcations of these
studies.3
i) First of all, the temporal horizon of the computed eﬀect matters, and
possibly makes the positive and negative theoretical views both valid, but with
respect to diﬀerent time spans. Indeed, in those few studies which distinguish
short-run from long-run eﬀects, a positive eﬀect is found in the latter case, and a
negative one in the former, especially with respect to service outsourcing (Gorzig
and Stephan, 2002), a point we will consider in the following. On the other
hand, requiring a comprehensive panel-structure of the microdata to be cap-
tured, such a result appears less systematically than at the aggregated-industry
level, at which is detected to hold with respect to several geographical contexts,
especially in terms of international outsourcing (e.g. Siegel and Griliches, 1992;
Fixler and Siegel, 1999; Egger and Egger, 2006).
ii) Second, the kind of activity which is outsourced matters too. Material
outsourcing, particularly international, impacts productivity – when it does
– to a lesser extent than service outsourcing and, in turn, service outsourcing
impacts productivity more when it is done by service rather than manufacturing
ﬁrms. Unlike the previous result, this is one for which sectoral evidences have
been accompanied by numerous studies at the ﬁrm-plant level, although with
3For a more conventional survey of these studies, see (Olsen, 2006, Tab.1, p.24) and the
ﬁrst part of Gorg, Hanley, and Strobl (2008).
8respect to speciﬁc geographical contexts – such as Ireland (Gorzig and Hanley,
2003; Gorg and Hanley, 2005; Gorg, Hanley, and Strobl, 2008) and United
Kingdom (Criscuolo and Leaver, 2005) – and industrial sectors – such as the
Italian automotive suppliers sector (Calabrese and Erbetta, 2004).
iii) Third, the degree of the ﬁrm’s internationalization increases the extent
at which outsourcing impacts its productivity, although this appears the case of
material outsourcing only. This is an aspect the empirical literature at the ﬁrm
level has been able to control quite accurately, not only by distinguishing the
domestic vs. international location of the plants in terms of FDIs (e.g. Tomiura,
2005), but also their exporting status (e.g. Gorg, Hanley, and Strobl, 2008).
As we said, these are quite general results which emerge from the review
of the empirical literature, in the sense that they hold true with respect to
an appreciable number of countries and sectors of applications. Nonetheless,
their generality degree diminishes when their methodology is considered more in
depth. Indeed, from their methodological discussion a number of issues emerge,
with respect to which the present paper, as we will see in Section 4, aims at
bringing its value added.
3.2 The empirical methodology
The ﬁrst methodological issue has to do with the heavy burden of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
elements of which the above mentioned general results are “stuﬀed”. Just by
scrolling the “remarks” column of the synthetic Table 1 Olsen (2006) builds up
to compare the literature, one is stroked by the high number of speciﬁcities on
which the results are conditional: economic sector, product market and market
structure, position along the value chain (up vs. downstream), size, capital
intensity, just to mention a few. What is more, diﬀerent studies use a limited
number of diﬀerent controls, while a general account of them is missing, mainly
because of the accounting origin of the used information. What is more, and for
the same reason, almost never these controls encompass ﬁrm-speciﬁc elements
which refer to its embeddedness into speciﬁc local system of production (LPS),
neglecting the territorial dimension of the outsourcing impact.
This is particularly unfortunate, as several contributions in the domain of re-
gional studies have shown that, in speciﬁc territorial contexts, outsourcing often
follows a ‘cooperative’ kind of pattern, quite at odds with the ‘competitive’ mode
usually envisaged when large, innovative, advanced ﬁrms sub-contract parts of
their production processes to technologically backward small ﬁrms (Taymaz and
Kilicaslan, 2005). In brief, “relying on tacit performance agreements, trust, and
9reciprocal adjustment” (Suarez-Villa, 1988, p.7), typical of LPS, outsourcing
has been proved to prevent the emergence of those disparities among ﬁrms - for
example, in access to physical and human capital, knowledge and competences
- which could result in the transaction impoverishing the innovative capabili-
ties of the smaller, or weaker partner and, conversely, to stimulate a number of
context-speciﬁc “outsourcing economies”.
A second methodological ﬂaw refers to the outsourcing measurements which
are used. Also at the ﬁrm-level, in fact, national outsourcing (OUTi) and
international outsourcing (OFFi) are inferred quite grossly by referring to a























i measures the intermediate inputs required by ﬁrm i to produce
the commodity j, Yi the total non-energy costs of ﬁrm i, Mj and Cj the imports
and the ﬁnal consumption of j, respectively.
While quite handy to use, and possibly sharpened through input-output
data, at the sectoral and intersectoral level, these indicators become quite cava-
lier proxies of outsourcing once referred to the ﬁrm level. Although easy to draw
from the ﬁrms’ balance-sheets, and to compare on their basis, their information
power is in fact quite blurred. As an example, consider the notable study by
Gorzig and Stephan (2002), carried out on as many as 43,000 German manu-
facturing companies over the period 1999-2000. The measures of outsourcing
they use, related to internal labour costs, are, for material outsourcing, “ma-
terial inputs costs”, for subcontracting, “external contract work costs”, and,
for service outsourcing, “other costs not related to production”. Apart from
the second kind of costs, it is immediate that the other two include some costs
which are not related to outsourcing activities, of which they provide a clear
overestimation.
The third and last methodological issue we have recognized in the empirical
literature is the quite delicate one of causality or, putting diﬀerently, of en-
dogeneity in addressing the relationship between outsourcing and productivity.
Given that the relationship could equally go the other way round, this potential
problem has to be taken very seriously, possibly by integrating the studies on
10the productivity impact with those on the outsourcing determinants. In his re-
cent study, for example, Tomiura (2005) found that the more productive ﬁrms
are also those which tend to outsourcing more internationally, and that the
same holds true for the ﬁrms with more labour-intensive production, computer
usage intensity, highly skilled employees, and R&D expenditure per employee,
considered as outsourcing determinants.
Unfortunately, the degree at which this potential problem has been actually
addressed is not satisfactory, as many of the reviewed studies, even those with
a pure cross-sectional nature, does not control for it. The same holds true with
respect to the other two issues, of which the present paper tries to provide a
more satisfactory kind of modelling.
4 Modelling the productivity impact of outsourc-
ing: a methodological proposal
Apart from some few studies estimating total factor productivity (TFP) and
carrying out TFP growth breakdowns and ANOVA analysis, the majority of
the studies estimate the impact of outsourcing on productivity by referring to
a production function framework (Olsen, 2006, p.9). In particular, sticking to
a Cobb-Douglas function, and assuming that outsourcing works through the
technology factor of the production function, an equation is estimated such as
the following:
yi − li = β0 + β1(li − ki) + β2li + β3OUTi + i (3)
where li = logLi, ki = logKi, yi = logYi (L and K stay for labour and
capital inputs, respectively, and Y for the ﬁrm’s output), OUTi refers to the
measure of outsourcing, β0 is a constant picking up the remaining production
technology factors, and i an error term with standard properties.4
As we noticed in the previous section, this formulation suﬀers from some
limitations that we try to overcome by referring to a “knowledge-production-
function” framework (Griliches, 1979) such as the following:
LABPRODi,t = β0+β1OUTi,t−1+β2PRODINPUTi,t−1+β3CONTi,t−1+i,t
(4)
4When the growth rate of labour productivity is estimated, instead, i.e. by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing
the base equation above, outsourcing is generally a ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀect.
11where LABPRODt stands for labour productivity at time t, PRODINPUTt−1
refers to the ﬁrm’s inputs at time t − 1 (i.e. physical capital per employee and
number of employees), while CONTt−1 refers to a suitable array of controls (i
is the usual ﬁrm subscript).
In other words, Equation 4 deﬁnes a reduced form which attempts to pro-
vide an explanation of the productivity impact of outsourcing by exploiting a
theoretically consistent set of covariates. Furthermore, in order to address the
methodological problems identiﬁed above, it encapsulates a number of solutions.
First of all, let us observe that, as a ﬁrst attempt to deal with potential endo-
geneity, a diachronic cross-section econometric model is used, with a temporal
lag on the outsourcing measure, OUT. As we will say in Section 7, a rigorous
endogeneity test, and an actual integration with previous studies we have car-
ried out on the outsourcing determinants of the same ﬁrms of the application,
is instead postponed to our future research agenda.
Second, in order to address the ﬁrm-speciﬁcity problem, the set of the con-
trols, CONT, retains simultaneously a wide number of variables which refer
to, in addition to such standard structural elements as size, sector and the like,
idiosyncratic techno-economic and institutional elements which are shared by
ﬁrms which are co-located in a speciﬁc LPS: the nature of industrial relations
and the kind of innovation patterns of the investigated ﬁrms are just two no-
table examples that we are able to capture due to the survey-based nature of
our data (see Section 5).
Last, but no least, we try to provide a more accurate measurement of out-
sourcing, by using, rather than balance-sheet outsourcing proxies, a direct in-





OUTij × sj (5)
In Equation 5, OUTij is the outsourcing intensity of a certain kind of activ-
ities j, that is the number of the same kind of activities j which are actually
outsourced by ﬁrm i (nij) out of a certain total of activities j identiﬁed with





sj is a weight which considers the increasing diﬃculties for the ﬁrm of out-
sourcing what we will call “ancillary activities” (j = 1 and sj = 1), “production
12supporting activities” (j = 2 and sj = 2), and “production activities” as such
(j = 3 and sj = 3) (see Section 5).
In brief, our outsourcing measure is a weighted average of the relative number
of activities which are outsourced by a certain ﬁrm, whose weights increase with
the diﬃculties of outsourcing increasingly more core activities.5
In addition to this synthetic indicator, the outsourcing intensity of the ﬁrm
i by activity j, that is Equation 6 will be also used.
Finally, the previous two measures will be contrasted with the results ob-
tained by using standard dummy-like kind of variables controlling for the simple
presence of at least one outsourcing operation for each kind of activity j. Far
from being pure technical devices in search for superior signiﬁcance, the in-
tensity and the dummy measures have a substantial diﬀerent nature. Indeed,
while the latter account for the simple choice of resorting to outsourcing or not,
being a sort of proxy of the make-or-by decision, the former also controls for
the extent at which, according to the production specialization of the ﬁrm itself,
outsourcing is used. Considering both of them is therefore more than opportune.
5 Outsourcing in the LPS of Reggio Emilia
5.1 The context
The empirical application we carry out in the paper refers to the province of
Reggio Emilia (RE). Based in the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna (Figure 1),
which the works by Giacomo Becattini (e.g. Becattini, 2001), Sebastiano Brusco
(Brusco, 1982) and their scholars have made internationally well-known for its
“industrial districts”, RE actually shares the typical features of the LPS of the
Italian North-East (Seravalli, 2001).
A recent survey, carried out on a population of 257 ﬁrms with at least 50
employees in 2002, reports some interesting insights in this last respect (Pini,
2004).
First of all, although the sample of the respondents is characterized by a
high density of ﬁrms whose size is ‘medium’, these ﬁrms are actually made up
of 2 or 3 plants, of which 1 or 2 only are usually located in RE, with an average
employment of no more than 145 employees (Pini, 2004, Appendix 1, Tables
11A and 11B of CD data).
Second, a considerable number of the surveyed ﬁrms are actually located in
‘industrial districts’, characterized by few but strong production specializations,
5For an extended discussion of this measure see Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini (2007b).
13Figure 1: The province of Reggio-Emilia
14namely: non-electrical machinery and equipments - machinery for mechanical
energy and agriculture in particular - and non metallic mineral products - ce-
ramic tales in particular. A large-scale kind of specialization is instead repre-
sented by other sectors such as clothing and communication equipments.6
Third, and most important for the sake of this paper, the analysis of a repre-
sentative sample of the ﬁrm population (described in the following) reveals that
RE is characterized by an extensive resort to outsourcing. Nearly 87% of the
sample have decentralised some of their activities from 1998 to 2001 (Antonioli
and Tortia, 2004, pag. 68), and as many as 52.3% of them to sub-contractors.
What is more, many of them has actually externalized their activities abroad,
making the LPS and the relative districts enter “global-value-chains” which
represent for them an important opportunity of capabilities upgrading and/or
costs saving but, at the same time, a serious challenge to their internal system
coherence, especially as far as job issues and industrial relations are concerned
(Carabelli, Hirsch, and Rabellotti, 2007; Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini, 2008).7
On the other hand, diﬀerences in outsourcing decisions emerge among the
RE ﬁrms by considering the number and the nature of the activities which are
externalised. In this last respect, as we said, the survey we are referring to
distinguishes as many as 17 activities, which we have grouped into 3 classes
according to a functional criterion: (i) “ancillary activities” (e.g. janitorial ser-
vices), so to say accessory to the production process as such, in turn meant as the
transformation of production inputs into output ; (ii) “production supporting
activities” (e.g. engineering), not primarily productive, but contributing to the
production process more directly than the former ; (iii) “production activities”
as such (Table 2).
On the basis of this classiﬁcation, let us observe that cleaning services, for
example, have been decentralized in 85.55% of the cases, while the percentage
falls to around 8% for non purely ancillary activities such as human-resource-
6For a more detailed analysis of these facts see Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini (2007b).
7As we will say, the dataset of the present application does not distinguish domestic from
international outsourcing, so that an accurate quantiﬁcation of the phenomenon is not yet
possible. On the other hand, as we have shown elsewhere (Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini,
2008), the number of RE actually involved in oﬀshoring strategies is quite remarkable. Out of
192 RE ﬁrms interviewed in a more recent survey for 2004, just 18% have made FDI regardless
of their export activities, but more than 56% established an agreement with a foreign network
in supporting their foreign commercial activities. What is more, anedoctical evidences reveal
how international outsourcing has in some cases reached the so called far “emerging powers”:
such as the case of Ognibene SPA which, after having opened an establishment in Caxias do
Soul (Brazil) in 2006, moved to Pune (India) in 2007, to arrive in Suzhou (China) in 2008
(www.ognibene.com/img-gen/worldita.JPG).
15Outsourced activities Outsourcing ﬁrms
(% of the total)
Ancillary activities
1 Inventories management 14.45%
2 Internal logistics 24.86%
3 Distribution logistics 24.28%
4 Cleaning services 85.55%
5 Plants maintenance 77.46%
6 Machinery maintenance 63.01%




10 Research & Development 16.18%
11 Labor consultancy 58.96%
12 Human resource management 8.67%
13 Quality control 8.09%
Production activities
14 Supply of intermediate products 52.52%
15 Production stages 44.60%
16 Products & Trademarks 14.39%
17 Other production activities 9.35%
100 = 166 (sample of respondent ﬁrms)
Table 2: Reggio Emilia: outsourcing ﬁrms of the sample by activity (1998-2001)
management (8.67%) and quality control (8.09%) (Table 2). More in general,
a distinction seems to emerge between material, routine-based activities with a
low-value added, which are often decentralized, and intangible activities with a
higher value-added, which instead are better performed internally.
As it has been shown in other studies of ours, these and other speciﬁc pat-
terns of outsourcing are related to the characteristics of the RE ﬁrms (Mazzanti,
Montresor, and Pini, 2008). In particular, it emerges that the role that unions
and industrial relations have in them is quite important (Mazzanti, Montresor,
and Pini, 2007b)8, as well as that of their innovation patterns (Mazzanti, Mon-
8Out of the 199 cases in which it has been possible to detect it, for example, 20.5% of the
ﬁrms informed the unions of their outsourcing decisions, and in 6% of the cases unions were
even consulted (Antonioli and Tortia, 2004).
16tresor, and Pini, 2007a). Also and above all in the light of these results, it turns
out interesting to investigate whether the estimates of Equation 4 are consis-
tent with the general patterns which have been identiﬁed in Section 3.1 in terms
of productivity impact. Or whether these LPS features work as counteracting
forces. An exercise that we will carry out by using the dataset illustrated in the
following section (Section 5.2).
5.2 The dataset
In the paper the LPS of RE is analyzed by combining two diﬀerent datasets.
The ﬁrst, used to build up our outsourcing indicators and to draw the relevant
controls, is based on the results of a wide ﬁrm-level survey – to which we have
referred in the previous section – carried out in 2002, with respect to the period
1998-2001, on the manufacturing ﬁrms located in RE. Out of a population of
257 ﬁrms with at least 50 employees in 2001 (Pini, 2004)9, a sample of 166 has
been extracted which have replied to both of two questionnaires addressed to
management and union representatives, respectively, and which had balance-
sheets available.10
The distribution of the sampled ﬁrms of the survey by sector and size is
characterized by a limited bias when comparing the 166 ﬁrms with all the 257
surveyed ﬁrms: the textile sector and ‘small-size’ ﬁrms (50 to 99 employees) are
slightly under-represented. However, a signiﬁcant distortion in all other sectors
and dimensional employees’ classes has been tested and rejected (Cochran, 1977)
(Table 6 Appendix).
The second dataset, used to build up our productivity measures, is repre-
sented by a collection of coherent balance-sheets data for manufacturing ﬁrms
located in RE over the period 1994-2005: that is, a period which spans from
the time of the previous survey (1998-2001) to the most recent year for which
comparable data-sheets are available (2005). Although the number of ﬁrms of
this second dataset is quite large too – the average number of ﬁrms over the
period is around 136 – its merger with the previous one determines a substan-
tial collapse of the ﬁnal working sample. In fact, when the year with the lowest
number of surveyed ﬁrms with subsequent balance-sheet data available is re-
9Several oﬃcial sources were used to construct the ﬁrm population: Reggio Emilia Chamber
of Commerce, Istat Census, Aida data bank, Impero data bank, balance sheets data bank of
the Reggio Emilia Camera del Lavoro Territoriale.
10The reply rate for management was of 77,4%, 199 ﬁrm out of the 257 of the popula-
tion. The union delegates interviewed were 181, which represents about the 79% of the ﬁrm
population with union representatives (228 ﬁrms).
17tained, the merged dataset reduces to 116 ﬁrms. To be sure, for some of the
single years of the period, the result of the matching is a higher number, al-
though with a tendency to a reduction as we move far away form the period of
data collection through the questionnaire.11 However, in order to homogenize
the results to the “same” working sample, and compare them over time, the
econometric estimates which follow refer to the minimum sample of 116 ﬁrms.
Such a sample is of course less representative. However, the Cochran (1977)
test excludes signiﬁcant problems of the working sample as a whole and makes
it a reliable sample of analysis, notwithstanding some inevitable distortions for
speciﬁc sectors or size classes (Table 6 Appendix).
6 How far does outsourcing increase labour pro-
ductivity in Reggio Emilia?
As we said in Section 3.2, an accurate analysis of the productivity impact of
outsourcing should ﬁrst of all address the delicate issue of endogeneity. To start
with, before adopting a standard two-stages approach, in the present paper this
will be done by referring to the diachronic nature of Equation 4 and by distin-
guishing the diﬀerent results obtained with respect to diﬀerent time horizons.
We will thus run regressions for it using, at ﬁrst, the average labour productiv-
ity of the 116 ﬁrms over the period 2002-2005, then the productivity shown by
them in 2002 – that is the closest year to the period for which outsourcing has
been detected (1998-2001) – and, ﬁnally, the ﬁrms’ productivity in 2005 – that
is the most far year from the same period.
In spite of the absolute closeness of the years, this econometric strategy will
also allow us to distinguish, at least in relative terms, short-run from medium-
long-run productivity eﬀects, as one of the most important points which emerges
from the literature review of the empirical studies (Section 3.1).
As far as the other crucial methodological problem is concerned, that of ﬁrm
heterogeneity, in order to mitigate it, the regressions will be run by retaining
a quite large number of controls, both in the CONT vector of Equation 4 and
in the form of multiplicative interaction terms with the relevant outsourcing
variables (Tables 7 and 8 Appendix). In particular, on the basis of the results
of the empirical literature and of the studies we have carried ourselves on the
outsourcing determinants of the RE ﬁrms, additive structural controls will be
11Taking into consideration the two extremes of the period 2002-2005, for example, the
number of interviewed ﬁrms with balance sheets in 2002 is 152, while in 2005 it goes down to
123.
18progressively extended from quite standard structural ones (Speciﬁcation 1),
through innovation related variables (Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini, 2007a)
(Speciﬁcation 2), to industrial relations based ones (Mazzanti, Montresor, and
Pini, 2007b) (Speciﬁcation 3). Multiplicative interaction terms will be instead
built up in order to capture sector speciﬁcities a la Pavitt12 (Speciﬁcation 4) and,
above all, the internationalization degree of the outsourcing ﬁrm (Speciﬁcation
5), here proxied with the ﬁrm belonging to an international rather than national
business group.13
Coming to the main results of the regressions14, an interesting point should
be stressed at the outset. Although quite illustrative in our previous studies on
outsourcing determinants Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini (2007a,b), the general
outsourcing intensity index of Equation 5, OUTi, referring to the weighted out-
sourcing intensity of all the ﬁrm’s activities, does not turn out signiﬁcant, in
any of the suggested speciﬁcations.15What is more, similar results are obtained
by referring to the unweighted average of the outsourcing intensities of the three
groups of activities (for scope constraints, the relative results are omitted). This
seems to suggest that, while diﬀerent kinds of activities might have at least some
common determinants, this is not true for their productivity eﬀects, which turn
out to be diﬀerent, as the empirical literature actually suggests (Section 3.1).
The productivity analysis of outsourcing thus requires to distinguish what
is actually outsourced: manufacturing or services, ancillary or core, low or high
value added. As a ﬁrst step in this direction, let us consider, as independent
12The starting point of this classiﬁcation is the quite well-known Pavitt taxonomy (Pavitt,
1984), where he identiﬁes four types of ﬁrms according to a set of characteristics he de-
tected through an extensive analysis carried out on 2000 innovations in Britain: supplier
dominated ﬁrms, scale-intensive ﬁrms, specialized suppliers and science-based ﬁrms. On this
basis the OECD has recently modiﬁed the Pavitt classiﬁcation introducing ﬁve types of ﬁrms:
scale-intensive ﬁrms, specialized suppliers, science-based, labour intensive ﬁrms and resource
intensive ﬁrms. The latter taxonomy is the one which we base part of our analysis on.
13We are aware that the simple dummy that captures the belonging to an international
group is quite limited in its power of explaining the degree of ﬁrm internationalization, but
at the same time we believe in its capacity of capturing some sort of international openness
of a ﬁrm.
14In all the reported regressions, the heteroskedasticity is addressed using robust standard
errors. As we are not interested in elasticities, t ratios only are shown. As a rule of thumb,
we have discarded those covariates having a t ratio lower than 0.5 in order to end up with a
parsimonious speciﬁcation through a process going from general to particular. The full set of
controls as reported in Tables 7 and 8 of the Appendix is used in the starting speciﬁcations.
The set of sector dummies is usually fully preserved in the speciﬁcations. Only the signiﬁcant
variables in at least one speciﬁcation are reported.
15The relative results have been omitted for scope constraints and are available from the
authors at request.
19variables, simple dummy variables accounting for the presence of at least one
externalization in each of the three groups of activities (Table 2), that is: produc-
tion (OUTPRODDum), encompassing what is usually called material outsourc-
ing (e.g. intermediate inputs), production-supporting (OUTSUPRODDum),
mainly referring to high-valued added services (e.g. R&D), and ancillary activ-
ities (OUTANCDum), within which we ﬁnd low valued-added service outsourc-
ing (e.g. of cleaning and janitorial services). In other words, let us start by
disregarding the intensity of outsourcing of each of this kind of activities and
estimate the productivity impact of being fully or non-fully vertically integrated
with respect to each of them.
6.1 Outsourcing or not outsourcing? “The law of dimin-
ishing returns” and service outsourcing
Quite interestingly, when the actual number of outsourced activities per kind
is disregarded, the average labour productivity over the 2002-2005 period is
only aﬀected by the externalization of service outsourcing: positively, by that of
high-value added services (OUTSUPRODDum) and negatively, although non
fully signiﬁcantly, by that of low-value added ones (OUTANCDum) (Table 3).
This appears consistent with what Olsen (2006) called the “law of dimin-
ishing returns from outsourcing”, according to which the potential gains from
outsourcing low value-added activities are exhausting, while a strategy of out-
sourcing high value-added activities still provides margins of gain.
Insert Table 3 around here
Still on line with other empirical results which do not present the territorial
speciﬁcation of the present one, the interactive terms with the ﬁrm’s belonging
to an international business group are strongly signiﬁcant, for all the three
kind of activities, and with a positive sign with respect to production ones
(OUTPRODDum): although by retaining the approximation of such a dummy,
this seems to conﬁrm that those ﬁrms which are more open to international
trade and investments are also more prone to beneﬁt from the advantages of
outsourcing and, possibly, of oﬀshoring in particular.
The analysis of the productivity impact of the outsourcing dummies in 2002
and 2005 (Table 3) provides another apparent conﬁrmation of what we know
from the investigations of big-companies’ externalization strategies, that is the
importance of the time horizon. On the one hand, the gains from outsourcing
production supporting activities are not immediate, as it seems to be needed a
20workforce re-skilling in order to reap the potential beneﬁts of high value added
outsourcing on labor productivity. On the other hand, the negative sign on
the productivity of ancillary activities emerges over time too, suggesting that
ﬁrms that outsource these activities do it in order to cut down production costs,
without planning further or contextual high value-added outsourcing activities.
So far, then, those results the empirical literature reports for other no or
less context speciﬁc empirical applications appear to be conﬁrmed in the LPS
of RE. Although quite interesting, however, such a conﬁrmation has been ob-
tained under the implicit assumption that the marginal propensity to outsource
is invariant across the three kinds of activity. Were this the case, RE would con-
ﬁrm what we already know on outsourcing and its impacts on ﬁrm productivity.
On the other hand, this is not realistic as the actual propensity of externaliz-
ing each group of activities should be retained as an idiosyncratic feature of
the context outsourcing ﬁrms are embedded in, an aspect that many empirical
studies seem to ignore. A more accurate dependent variable in this last respect
can be the outsourcing intensity by kind of activity of Equation 6, whose results
are illustrated in the following section.
6.2 How much is actually outsourced? The role of mate-
rial outsourcing
Re-running the regressions with respect to Equation 6, the picture of the results
changes substantially. Starting with the average productivity over the 2002-2005
period (Table 4), the only kind of activity whose outsourcing signiﬁcantly aﬀects
it is represented by production activities as such (OUTPROD), in all the ﬁrst
three speciﬁcations, that is irrespectively from the covariates utilized, such as
innovation indexes (Speciﬁcation 2) and industrial relations variables (Speciﬁca-
tion 3). The externalization of inner phases of the production process thus seems
to be the only one with a positive impact on the RE ﬁrms’ performance, while
that of service outsourcing, both low (OUTANC) and high (OUTSUPROD)
value-added, apparently vanishes. Quite at odds with the “generic” empirical
literature on the topic, this result appears instead consistent with the district
nature of this LPS, where ﬁrms increase their productivity also by tapping into
the superior competences of external, (possibly) geographically closer, manu-
facturing suppliers. Indeed, the embodied nature of the knowledge of this kind
of activities, along with the same district atmosphere of the RE province, both
work in mitigating the risk of knowledge leakage which usually hampers its
eﬀects.
21Insert Table 4 around here
Looking at the two speciﬁcations with the interaction terms with respect
to the ﬁrm internationalization and sector of activity, more speciﬁc relation-
ships emerge (Table 4). On the one hand, it seems that the resource-intensive
ﬁrms that outsource production activities are those which gain more from such
a strategy (Speciﬁcation 4). This appears consistent with our previous inter-
pretation, as this kind of ﬁrms, usually “low-knowledge intensive” (Foss and
Laursen, 2005), might need to ﬁnd outside the ﬁrm boundaries the competences
enabling them to deal with changes in production activities required by the
market. On the other hand, and more important, the interaction with the in-
ternationalization degree of the outsourcing ﬁrm (Speciﬁcation 5) yields back
the general result we got by working with the relative dummies: the outsourc-
ing of high-value added services (that is, our OUTSUPROD) positively aﬀects
the ﬁrm’s productivity, but of international ﬁrms only, while the belonging to
any kind of national or international group makes signiﬁcant and negative the
productivity impact of the outsourcing of low-value added services (that is, our
OUTANC). This is another extremely interesting results, which suggests that
the “high-road” to the beneﬁts of outsourcing high-level services requires ﬁrms
to draw on international markets and is thus possibly reserved to multinational
corporations through oﬀshoring and global sourcing strategies.
As expected, when the indexes of outsourcing intensity per activity are re-
gressed against the simultaneous productivity of the investigated ﬁrms, that
is for 2002, no one of them appears signiﬁcant, apart from production activi-
ties (OUTPROD), which is just marginally signiﬁcant when innovation related
variables (Table 5, Speciﬁcation 2) are considered. If we also except the cases of
labour intensive and specialized suppliers ﬁrms, for which reorganization prob-
lems does not seem to be large enough to prevent an immediate productivity
impact of production supporting and production activities, respectively (Spec-
iﬁcation 4), working with outsourcing indexes conﬁrms the general result, in
turn conﬁrmed by working with outsourcing dummies, of the need of a tem-
poral delay for outsourcing to aﬀect labour productivity. In general, then, the
productivity impact of outsourcing is not a short-run phenomenon, also when
the reference is to speciﬁc LPS such as that of RE.16
16Such a general result is conﬁrmed by an important exception, as the interaction terms
involving the dummies national/international group and the outsourcing indexes obtains the
same results we got using the average productivity over the period 2002-2005 (Speciﬁcation
5). This is somehow unexpected, when one considers the larger diﬃculties that ﬁrms working
on international markets have in reorganizing in the aftermath of outsourcing. On the other
22Insert Table 5 around here
When productivity is considered as far as possible from the occurrence of
outsourcing, that is in 2005 (Table 5), the outsourcing intensity of production
activities (OUTPROD) turns out to be signiﬁcant in all of the ﬁrst three spec-
iﬁcations. Overall, this suggests that the sign and the level of signiﬁcance of
the impact of OUTPROD on the average productivity of the period 2002-2005
are driven by the last years of the period over which the performance variable
is computed: and this provides a further evidence of the temporal dimension
of the phenomenon we have investigated. The positive and signiﬁcant sign of
this kind of outsourcing is conﬁrmed also by the results of the two other speci-
ﬁcations with interactive terms (Speciﬁcation 4 and 5). Furthermore, these last
speciﬁcations conﬁrm the sectoral and geographical qualiﬁcations which medi-
ate the productivity impact of the outsourcing of the high-value-added services
encompassed in the production supporting activities (OUTSUPROD): indeed,
this occurs only for ﬁrms which belong to an international group and mainly
for those which are specialized suppliers, an aspect that appears consistent with
the nature of the intersectoral ﬂows of the Pavitt taxonomy.
7 Conclusions and future research agenda
As a way to conclude, it seems to us important to establish whether the results
we have obtained about the productivity impact of the outsourcing strategies
of the RE ﬁrms are or not corroborative of what we know from the (scanty)
empirical evidence on the issue. Unfortunately, the answer is not unambiguous.
On the one hand, also with respect to the speciﬁc LPS under investigation, as
with respect to other no or less geographical-speciﬁc contexts, the productivity
impact of outsourcing is highly dependent on the outsourced activity. What is
more, when the actual intensity of the diﬀerent kinds of outsourcing is neglected,
diminishing returns from outsourcing manufacturing activities and low value-
added (ancillary) services vs. positive productivity impacts from outsourcing
high value-added (production supporting) activities emerge in RE as in many
other studies at the national level, from which local speciﬁcations are absent.
Finally, by assuming an equal propensity to outsource across the diﬀerent kinds
of considered activities, the analysis of RE conﬁrms other two general results,
that is: the need of a temporal lag for outsourcing to exert its positive and nega-
tive impacts on productivity, and the ampliﬁcation eﬀects that on productivity
hand, it is also true that the roughness of our proxy might hinder other counteracting factors,
such as a superior eﬃciency imposed by international vs. national markets.
23has the outsourcing implemented by ﬁrms with a higher internationalization
degree.
On the other hand, when the actual extent at which the diﬀerent kinds of
activities are outsourced is retained, as a distinguishing feature of the context
in which the outsourcing ﬁrms are embedded, the RE picture appears less sup-
portive of the general evidence and rather shows some important exceptions to
it. First of all, the analysis of outsourcing intensity seems to make vanish the
productivity impact of service outsourcing, both low and high value added, and
makes instead emerge the positive one of the externalization of inner phases of
the production process. As we said, this is an important exception with respect
to the “generic” empirical literature on the topic, but a result which seems to
us consistent with the district nature of the investigated LPS. Second, and re-
lated, the outsourcing of production supporting activities is not just strengthen,
but even conditioned and actually allowed by the internationalization degree of
the outsourcing ﬁrm. Accordingly, in the investigated LPS context, beneﬁting
from the externalization of high value-added services seems to be a privilege of
multinational or transnational ﬁrms. Last, but not least, although quite un-
expected, for the same kind of international ﬁrms, the temporal span which is
normally required for outsourcing to impact on productivity seems to become
unnecessary.
As we have repeatedly noticed, the results we have just summarized represent
a sort of ﬁrst crop of a research program which aims at reﬁning them in more
than one respect. First of all, formal testings of endogeneity will be carried out
and, eventually, the results of the present paper will be confronted with those
obtained by working out the productivity impact of an estimated outsourcing
variable, obtained on the basis of previous works of ours on the outsourcing
determinants of RE ﬁrms. Second, the delicate issue of ﬁrm heterogeneity will
be further addressed by enriching the number of controls and, above all, by
reﬁning the analysis of the internationalization degree of the ﬁrms and of their
outsourcing strategies. Last, but not least, the analysis will be progressively
extended to the impact of outsourcing on proﬁtability, total factor productivity
and to the relative rates of growth. Indeed, these are possibly more intriguing
issues to investigate, with respect to which, however, the one we have addressed
in the present paper represents at least a useful background.
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30Dependent LnVA/ LnVA/ LnVA/ LnVA/ LnVA/
Emp0205 Emp0205 Emp0205 Emp0205 Emp0205
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5
Covariates
Past Balance Sheets Variables
lnPhysCap/Emp9801 3.14*** 2.72*** 3.40*** 4.3*** 2.87***
Outsourcing
OUTPROD 1.83* 2.26** 1.94* n.s. n.s.
Controls
Sector Dummies yes yes yes no yes
ENTR -2.32** -2.09** -2.88*** -1.90* n.s.
Innovation Activities
TECINNO - -2.31** - -1.77* -1.69*
Industrial Relations
UNION n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
FORMINDREL n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
RELMANUNI n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Interaction Terms
OUTPROD-RI - - - 3.64*** -
OUTSUPROD-INT - - - - 2.20***
OUTANC-INT - - - - -2.08***
-cons 14.36*** 13.42*** 11.71*** 14.11*** 13.88***
N 114 114 101 114 114
F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.34
VIF 3.45 3.08 2.46 1.99 3.22
NB: t ratios only are shown with the following notation:
*: signiﬁcant at 10%; **: signiﬁcant at 5%; ***: signiﬁcant at 1%.
- : the variable is not included in the speciﬁcation; n.s.: not signiﬁcant but included in the
speciﬁcation;
VIF: Variance Inﬂation Factor measure of the degree of multicollinearity (threshold for
multicollinearity: 10)
Table 4: Regression results: outsourcing intensity per activity, 2002-2005
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